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Nicos Mouzelis*
MoDernITY.
THe FUnDaMenTaLIST DIMenSIon
The basic argument in this paper is that fundamentalism is mo -
dern not only or primarily in terms of the material and organiza-
tional technologies that it uses: it is also modern in terms of its ba-
sic sociostructural features, features which have an elective affini-
ty with the unique characteristics of modernity. Choosing Islamic
fundamentalism as an example, I will also try to see how the so-
ciostructural level of the phenomenon relates, not only to the cul-
tural but also to the psychodynamic/psychoanalytic level.
1. On the specificity of  the fundamentalist phenomenon
I THInK that what distinguishes fundamentalism from pre-mo -
dern authoritarian religious movements or regimes is not so much
the cultural/ideological features which are usually referred to
in order to establish its features; such as the attempt to return
to an idealized ‘golden’ past, the literal interpretation of sacred
texts, the creation and demonization of an external enemy which
enhances the religious community, the distinction between the
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believers’ pure way of life and the unbelievers’ ‘contaminated’
one etc.1 although such attributes characterize fundamentalism,
they are not unique to it. Most of them are to be found in pre-
modern religious authoritarianisms, from antiquity onwards. There-
fore they do not establish its specificity. What makes fundamen-
talism quintessentially modern are its sociostructural features.
If, for example, we consider fundamentalism’s authoritari-
an and often violent orientations (and I refer here to both phy -
sical and symbolic violence), it differs from religious oppression
in a pre-modern, segmentally organized setting. In the latter case,
low individuation means that traditional subjects experience re-
ligious discipline and restrictive rules in a qualitatively different
way than in a modern social formation whose social structure is
characterized by top-down differentiation and widespread indi-
vidualization. To be more specific, it is one thing to impose the
sharia in a traditional, non-differentiated community and quite
another to impose its rules on modern, highly individualized citi-
zens who have a greater need for autonomy and self-realization.
2. Fundamentalism: the cultural dimension
In cultural terms, religious fundamentalism is a reaction to mo -
dernism –or rather to certain of its aspects; such as widespread
secularization, religious relativism, libertarian sexual norms,
the legitimation of homosexuality, feminism etc. This reaction
is linked to a project aiming at a return to ‘fundamentals’. In Is-
lamic fundamentalism for instance, the focus is on a return to a
past fraternal community (the Ummah), the strict observation
of the sharia, the opposition to western cultural and geopolitical
imperialism etc. Given the great variety of Islamic traditions,
one can always find features which differ from one tradition to
another.2 For instance, in the shia tradition the emphasis is less
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1. For an exploration of such features, see Marty & appleby 1994.
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on an idealized past and more on a future golden age when the
hidden 12th Imam will appear again (Sachedina 1994: 410).
Therefore, in this case we have a messianic redemption similar
to Christ’s second coming.
In all cases, the return to a past or future golden age is highly
selective (eisenstadt 1999). only certain cultural features of the
tradition are selected in order to mobilize believers against a de-
monized foe who is responsible for all social ills. For instance,
Khomeini appropriated and radicalized certain features of the
original shia Islam (which was quietistic) in order to mobilize
the believers against the Pahlavi regime. More generally, he ‘mo -
dernised’ certain aspects of the religious tradition in order to
make them compatible with the nation state. another point worth
mentioning is that Islamic fundamentalism is exclusivist –in
the sense that other religious faiths are not tolerated (jihadists aim
at the Islamisation of the world by more or less violent means).
on the other hand, it is ‘inclusionist’ in the sense that religion
should penetrate/dominate all non religious institutional spheres
–from education and recreation to politics and science. The ul-
timate end, as in totalitarian regimes,3 is the total transforma-
tion of the societal and personality systems.
There is also the dogma of the Koran’s inerrancy which
characterizes Christian fundamentalism as well. But careful se-
lection of a sacred text’s features which are useful for popular
mobilization distinguishes strict scriptural literalism from the
Islamic fundamentalist interpretation of sacred texts. The con-
tradiction between selectivity and inerrancy is usually solved by
the distinction between more and less fundamental aspects of
the Koran. There is also the notion of ‘dynamic interpretation’:
given that Islam entails political struggle, one needs to interpret
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3. For certain scholars, Jacobinism, as well as totalitarian regimes, com-
munism and racism, are considered as fundamentalist in the secular/politi-
cal rather than religious sense (eisenstadt 1999). In this text, fundamentalism
refers exclusively to the religious dimension. When the concept is used in
its broader sense, I think that it loses part of its analytical, heuristic utility.
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the fundamental Koranic principles in the light of the ongoing
war against the infidels. For Sayyid Qutb, for instance, an ac-
tivist interpretation of the Koran is necessary if people are to
understand its true meaning.4
3. Fundamentalism: The sociostructural dimension
When conceptualised in sociostructural rather than cultural terms,
modernity refers to the type of social organization which became
dominant in the West after the Industrial revolution in eng-
land and the revolution of 1789 in France. It entails three basic
features, which distinguishes it from all pre-modern social for-
mations:
Ξ The decline of segmental localism and the inclusion of
the population into the national centre/nation state.
Ξ The top-down differentiation of institutional spheres.
Ξ Widespread individualization.
a. Mobilisation/inclusion
In ideal typical terms, the decline of segmental localism meant
the transformation of the traditional non differentiated local
community into a less self-contained social whole open to the
direct influence of broader social forces. It meant in other terms
the inclusion of the whole population into the ‘imagined com-
munity’ (anderson 1991) of the nation state, into its wider eco-
nomic, political and cultural arenas. This inclusionary process
led to the transfer of material and symbolic resources from the
periphery to the national centre. From an actors’ perspective, it
led to the concentration of not only the means of production,
but also the means of domination/violence, as well as the means
of cultural influence into the hands of national rather than lo-
cal/regional elites. It is via such mobilising, ‘bringing-in’ pro -
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cesses that the modern state apparatus penetrated the periphe -
ry in a manner which was unthinkable in all pre-modern social
formations, however despotic.
Deep state penetration and the inclusionary process can take
both autonomous and heteronomous forms. In the former case
civic, political, socioeconomic and cultural rights spread gradu-
ally ‘downwards’, this resulting into a strong civil society which
operated as a buffer to state authoritarianism (the typical case is
19th and 20th century Britain). In the heteronomous case, peo-
ple were brought into the centralized administrative, military,
cultural and economic mechanisms of the nation state but with-
out the granting of rights (the case of 19th century Prussia).5
on the basis of the above definition, one can view a funda-
mentalist regime as a form of heteronomous inclusion into the
national, politico-religious centre. as to a fundamentalist move-
ment, one can view it in a related manner: as an attempt at gain-
ing, through massive mobilisation, state power (or influence) in
order to impose in authoritarian fashion, a set of ‘fundamental’
religious principles.6
If we take as an example the Iranian theocratic regime, we
can easily identify processes drawing believers into the national
centre. This entails a shift of material and symbolic resources
from the periphery to the centre; or to put it in actors’ terms, it
entails the concentration of the ‘means of salvation’ from local
to national religious elites. Moreover, from a macro-historical
perspective, in pre-modern Iran, as in most traditional societies,
one observes a marked divide between popular/folk religiosity
at the periphery and ‘high Islam’ at the centre. The former was
closely linked to the local culture of the traditional community.
It was characterized by illiteracy, the prevalence of oral traditions,
beliefs in local saints as intermediaries between believers and
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5. For the distinction between autonomous and heteronomous inclu-
sionary processes, see Mouzelis 2008: 145-163.
6. Traditional Islamic movements like the Wahabite which aimed at
the Islamisation of arab society are called “proto-fundamentalist” by eisen-
stadt (1999: 33-5).
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God, superstitious/magical orientations etc. on the other hand,
high Islam was based on sacred texts, disconnected from localist
traditions and ‘prejudices’, as well as on religious specialists who
codified and interpreted such texts. This divide was attenuated
as administrative and material technologies of the national, po -
litico-religious elites penetrated the periphery.7
In the Iranian case, during the pre-Khomeini period, the
shah’s attempt at rapid but misdirected8 modernisation (both in
the agricultural and industrial sectors) led to rapid urbanization
(Bharier 1971, Graham 1979) and the subsequent weakening of
the traditional, non differentiated, village community (Sachedi-
na 1994: 418).9 These processes created a large underclass of ur-
ban,10 deracinated, peripheralised poor who were easily mobili sed
by anti-shah forces. Therefore, both during the pre-Khomeini
and the Khomeini period, we witness clearly modernity’s process
of mobilisation and inclusion into the broader economic, politi-
cal, religious and cultural arenas of the nation-state. This inclu-
sionary process was heteronomous rather than autonomous –in
the sense that people were ‘brought-in’ without the granting of
political rights. Indeed at present the Iranian fundamentalist
regime is sustained by such bodies as ‘the Guardians of the re -
volution’, as well as by militias, the most important of which is
the paramilitary, ideologically driven Basij organization. The lat-
ter played a key role in controlling dissidents and in systemati-
cally suppressing with more or less violent means11 any opposi-
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1981. See also Sharot 2001: 3-19 and 202-210.
8. For the mismanagement of the Iranian oil boom, see Graham 1979:
32-52 and 77-130.
9. For the process of urbanization and its social impact, see Bharier
1971 and Graham 1979.
10. one of the factors which explain why a Khomeini type revolution
did not occur in Iraq has to do with the relative resilience of the traditional
village community (Sachedina 1994: 438ff ).
11. Violent means included arbitrary arrests, executions and property
confiscations (Bakhash 1984: 155).
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tion to the regime. at present the Basij organization is engaged
in such activities as internal security, law enforcement, organiz-
ing religious ceremonies, suppressing dissident gatherings, moral
policing etc. It has branches in most towns and peripheral areas
and is often linked to local mosques. It is by this type of mecha-
nisms that the Iranian people are mobilised and brought into
the politico-religious centre (Bakhash 1984, Bernard & Zalmay
1984, arjomand 1988).
We have of course similar processes in several Islamic coun-
tries (e.g. egypt, Tunisia, algeria etc.) which, after a period of
nationalist socialist regimes were followed by conservative au-
tocracies. In the latter cases, fundamentalist parties constituted
the main quasi-legal organized opposition.12 It is not therefore
surprising that fundamentalist organizations like the Muslim
Brotherhood played a crucial role in the arab Spring movements
in the Middle east and northern africa (rubin 2010). needless
to say, with rapid globalization the inclusionary process expands
from the nation state to the so called ‘global village’ level –as
people are brought into the global centre via deterritorialized
networks, networks which recruit and bring into the transna-
tional sphere believers ready to fight against western infidels.
B. Top-down differentiation
Moving from an actors’ to a more systemic perspective, the se -
cond unique feature of modernity is the differentiation of na-
tional society into analytically distinct institutional spheres, each
one, at least potentially, portraying its own values, logic and his-
torical trajectory. It is true, of course, that pre-modern, complex
social formations were also differentiated along economic, po-
litical and cultural lines. But in such cases the differentiation
process was limited at the top. The societal base was typically or-
ganized along non differentiated segmental lines (Marx 1964).
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once a society is fully (i.e. both horizontally and vertically)
differentiated, following Parsons, there is a problem of integra-
tion: of how to coordinate, to bring together the differentiated
institutional subsystems so that increased “adaptive capacity” is
achieved. For the father of modern sociological theory, modern
societies tend to achieve a balance between institutional subsys-
tems (economic, political, social, cultural) via quasi-automatic,
systemic mechanisms (Parsons 1971: 27, 1977). Contra Parsons,
I think that under modern conditions, the integration of diffe -
rentiated institutional spheres is not automatic, nor always ba -
lancing –in the sense of always respecting the autonomy of each
sphere. often integration/coordination is achieved in a levelling
manner, by a dominant institution (political or religious) destroy-
ing the autonomous logic of all other social spheres. In other
terms, social integration can take both monologic and polylogic
forms (Mouzelis 2008: 49-54).
The differentiation of institutional spheres entails, of course,
the differentiation of roles and a role player’s identities. The mul-
tiplication of a subject’s identities also requires integrative efforts
on his/her part. This condition generates intense anxiety which
renders difficult the balanced integration of an individual’s mul-
tiple and fluid identities. Therefore, as in the case of institutio -
nal integration, the integration of identities can take both a ba -
lancing and levelling form. In the latter case, one of the subject’s
identities dominates all other identities undermining their rela-
tive autonomy and specific logic. This brings about a rigid sta-
bility, reduces anxiety, but inhibits the type of creativity that late
modern conditions make possible. It may therefore lead to ex-
treme forms of fanaticism.
Levelling identity integration characterizes the fundamen-
talist case. Fundamentalist regimes oppose secularization and, in
the case of Islam, aim at the “Islamisation” of the entire society.
For instance, in the Iranian case, Khomeini’s cultural revolu-
tion Islamised the universities by the dismissal of thousands of
teachers. The same was true in the armed forces; officers con-
sidered ‘westernised’ were dismissed (arjomand 1988). In the case
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of fundamentalist movements trying to take over the state, over-
all Islamisation is one of their main objectives. For example,
radical politico-religious movements, both in the Middle east
and in africa, want to impose the sharia and, more generally,
the overall traditional religious logic in all social spheres. To
the extent that this is achieved, we do not have institutional and
role dedifferentiation –in the sense that there is no return to
segmental forms of social organization. The separation of roles
remains, but roles lose their autonomous logic. It is important
therefore, in order to avoid theoretical confusion, to replace the
usual distinction between differentiation/dedifferentiation by the
threefold one proposed here: non differentiation (segmental or-
ganization), formal differentiation (levelling integration of iden-
tities/institutions) and substantive differentiation (balancing in-
tegration). Given that levelling, monologic integration is imposed
on highly individualized subjects, i.e. subjects with marked self-
realization needs, as already mentioned, its repressive impact is
qualitatively different from that experienced in pre-modern so-
cial formations. This brings us to an examination of the third
unique feature of modernity, that of widespread individualization.
C. Widespread individualization
The third sociostructural feature of modernity refers to the growth
of reflexivity and the overall enhancement of individualization.13
according to Giddens, in pre-modern contexts traditional values
and norms provided clear guidelines on how to conduct one’s
life, on how to relate to friends and foes, to relatives and stran -
gers. In other terms, traditional codes were creating a stable nor -
mative context limiting considerably the choices that a subject
had. In early modernity, collective ideologies (focusing on na-
tion, class, party etc.) played a similar role. They created a post-
traditional context which provided guidance and meaning to
everyday existence (Giddens 1994).
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In late globalised modernity however both traditional and
early modern certainties tend to disappear. on whether to marry
or not, on how many children to have, what life style to adopt,
whether to believe in God or not –in all these and many other
areas, the subject is obliged/forced to choose without the help
of an already given facilitating framework. Instead, one has to
create it oneself. In other words, one has to create ‘one’s own
biography’ –or as Ulrich Beck has put it, one has to create ‘a
life of one’s own’. one can argue of course that the non existence
of a stable framework and the enhanced reflexivity and individ-
ualization that it entails can be found in pre-modern situations,
particularly among cultural elites. What is unique in late moder-
nity however is that the type of reflexivity which detraditional-
ization entails spreads from the elite to the non elite level. Indi-
vidualization is no longer limited to philosophers and artists; it
is to be found among people in all walks of life (Beck & Beck-
Gernsheim 2003).
It could also be argued of course that the fundamentalist’s
monologic orientations, his/her fanaticism can be found in pre-
modern contexts. However, traditional fanaticism is qualitative-
ly different from the fundamentalist’s zealotism encountered in
late modernity. The difference relates to the top-down differen-
tiation and widespread individualization of the late modern era.
These sociostructural features entail the necessity of replacing
the already given, facilitating traditional framework by a ‘self-
made’ one; creating thus a fanaticism related to the specific an -
xiety that late modern conditions produce. In simpler terms, the
fanaticism of a religiously oriented traditional peasant is diffe -
rent from that of a late modern deracinated, highly individuated,
urban unemployed believer.
another specific fundamentalist characteristic which is re-
lated to modernity’s unique sociostructural features is the vision
of an overall, total transformation of society and personality. Such
a grandiose vision could be imagined by pre-modern utopias,
but could not be seriously attempted in a traditional social for-
mation characterized by a chasm between social differentiation
nICoS MoUZeLIS174
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at the top and non differentiation at the social base. Segmental
organization renders very difficult the type of mobilisation that
overall, societal transformation entails. The idea of an overall,
total societal transformation, as far as the possibility of its real-
ization is concerned, is specifically modern. To the extent that
modernity undermines traditional localisms (economic, political,
cultural) and brings people into the national centre, the notion
of an overall total change of society and the subject emerges both
as project and as realistic possibility. Maududi, a famous scholar
whose thought had a great influence on the Muslim Brotherhood
in the Middle east, insists on the necessity of total transformation
of a believer’s way of life: ‘a person cannot be a true Muslim if
he fulfils Islamic obligations in his personal life but neglects Is-
lamic teachings in his political and economic behaviour’.14
4. Fundamentalism: The psychodynamic dimension
Moving finally to a more psychodynamic/psychoanalytic dimen-
sion, one should raise the question of the type of subject (psy-
chologically speaking) which, under favourable conditions, opts
for a fundamentalist mode of existence. as far as our example
of Islamic fundamentalism is concerned, by favourable condi-
tions I mean well known socioeconomic and politico-religious
features such as: large scale unemployment, urban poverty, pe-
ripheralisation of the educated middle class youth, existence of
religious schools which are against globalization and a modernist
culture, aggressive post-colonial nationalism etc. To put it dif-
ferently, given ‘fundamentalogenic’/sociostructural pressures as
the ones mentioned above, what type of subject is likely to yield
to such pressures? Why do certain subjects react in a ‘fundamen-
talist’ manner whereas others do not? among major psychoana-
lytic approaches, those of Freud, Melanie Klein and Jacques La-
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can have been used by more recent psychoanalytically oriented
theorists in order to explain the conscious and unconscious
processes which lead a subject to the acceptance of radical/ex-
tremist fundamentalist orientations and practices.
a. The Freudian perspective
Concerning the Freudian perspective for instance, ruth Stein
(2010) starts with Freud’s theory of the primaeval horde and its
revolt against a domineering father. The murder of the father
by his rebellious sons entails both liberation and remorse –these
two elements leading to the creation of civilization. ruth Stein
reverses the Freudian narrative. In the case of the jihadist type
of fundamentalism, the son identifies with the father and turns
his back to the mother, and to the feminine in general. He wants
to please the father in a total, unconditional manner. according
to Stein, an extreme interpretation of the jihad notion is that an
infidel has three options: to be Islamised, to be subjugated eco-
nomically and politically, or to be killed. Since this is allah’s
will, the jihadist, by killing infidels follows a divine order. More-
over, in the case of the suicide bomber, by killing himself/her-
self and becoming a martyr, s/he shows in the most concrete
way his/her unconditional love for the father/God. In psycho-
analytic terms, this means regressive identification with the fa-
ther leading, in its extreme form, to total self-sacrifice. For the
jihadist, this is a passage from the anxieties that late modernity
generates to a close reunion with the father/God. It is also a
straightforward response to the humiliation and suffering that
western colonialism and post-colonialism/neo-imperialism has
inflicted and continues to inflict on the Islamic people.
according to Stein, it is not objective conditions such as ab-
ject poverty, social peripheralisation, extreme forms of exploita-
tion etc. which lead to radical/jihadist fundamentalism. It is
rather the inner logic of an extremist ideology which generates
psychodynamic mechanisms leading the subject to resolve the
oedipal complex in a regressive manner, in a manner which leads,
nICoS MoUZeLIS176
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not to the killing of the father, but rather to killing for the ‘love
of the father’.15
Stein’s analysis is a clear example of a tendency in psycho-
analytically oriented theories to explain fundamentalism (as well
as similar phenomena such as racism, chauvinistic nationalism,
anti-Semitism etc.) by focusing almost exclusively on psychody-
namic processes; ignoring ‘objective’ conditions, or at best, con-
sidering them as given. There is therefore no serious attempt to
link in a theoretically congruent manner the psychodynamic with
the social. This leads to reductionism, to a methodologically
‘jumping of levels’, to the absorption of the social by the psy-
choanalytic. It is not therefore surprising that the author of For
the Love of  God argues that sociostructural, objective conditions
such as poverty and social peripheralisation, contrary to the the-
ories of Fanon and Said, cannot explain radical fundamentalism,
since all over the world there are situations where extreme po -
verty and peripheralisation do not lead to the emergence of fun-
damentalism in general and to jihadism in particular. This will
not do, if sociostructural conditions cannot in themselves explain
radical fundamentalism, neither can the logic of the jihadist dis-
course and its relation to the way the subject handles the oedi-
pal situation provide a satisfying explanation.
The way to avoid reductive explanations is to articulate in a
non ad hoc manner psychoanalytic processes with the unique
sociostructural features of late modernity. For instance, the spread
of fundamentalism is difficult in situations where extremely poor
people are segmentally organised. even in an Islamic country
where the fundamentalist narrative prevails in urban centres,
the still rural, traditional communities are more or less immune
to fundamentalogenic pressures. Fundamentalism, as already
mentioned in 3a above, entails massive mobilisation and inclu-
sion into the broader national arenas of the nation state. It is
such processes which undermine segmental localism and shift
orientations from the periphery to the national centre. When
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these processes have not yet penetrated the segmentally organised,
non differentiated social base, fundamentalism cannot take roots.
Let us take Iran as an example. Before the shah’s ‘white revolu-
tion’, which entailed rapid economic development, radical fun-
damentalism existed as an ideology but did not have a serious
impact on the rural population. as already mentioned, it is the
shah’s grandiose plans for overall rapid modernisation of Iran-
ian society that created conditions which undermined the non-
differentiated traditional community and made possible the
penetration of the state into the periphery. It is such conditions
which led to the mobilisation against the shah’s regime that
Khomeini and his followers achieved in the 70’s (Bharier 1971,
Graham 1979). If all the above sociostructural conditions are
bracketed or are completely ignored, a psychoanalytic explana-
tion ‘hangs in the air’, so to speak. It cannot explain why the
fundamentalist logic takes root under certain conditions and
has no serious impact in other social spaces. To put it in a more
general way, since fundamentalism is a specifically modern phe-
nomenon, you cannot explain it without taking seriously into
account modernity’s unique features –i.e. massive mobilisation
and inclusion into the national centre, top-down differentiation
and broad individualization.
B. The Kleinian perspective
Moving from Freud to Melanie Klein, her theory of the processes
which lead to splitting and projection is also used in order to ex-
plain extreme nationalism, racism and other radical ideologies
entailing similar to fundamentalism features. according to the
Kleinian perspective, in his/her early development (the schizoid-
paranoid phase), the infant experiences internalised objects, par-
ticularly the maternal breast as being good and bad. The ag-
gressive part of the primitive ego is projected to the ‘bad’ breast,
whereas the benign ego is projected to the ‘good’ one. This split-
ting is considerably attenuated in a subsequent phase (the de-
pressive phase) as the subject starts feeling both her/his ego
nICoS MoUZeLIS178
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and the other as integrated and as possessing both good and
bad objects. When this integration is not achieved, the splitting
between good and bad elements is accentuated and the latter
are projected to the other who is imagined as an enemy, as a de-
monised other.16
In the Kleinian case as well, explanation of racism or fun-
damentalism as collective phenomena by mere reference to psy-
chodynamic processes is not enough. To move in a non reduc-
tive manner from the psychodynamic to the sosiostructural, one
should try to deal with the following basic issue: objective so-
ciostructural conditions such as poverty, religious ideologies and
organizations, western cultural imperialism etc. have to be taken
into account in order to explain why splitting and projection
processes are oriented to western ‘infidels’ rather than to other
groups (e.g. tribal enemies). Given this, one has to show how psy-
chodynamic processes articulate with specific ‘objective’ socio -
structural conditions. For instance, in urban poverty or anti-mo -
dernism which is the more important dimension? In other terms,
it is not enough to produce a long list of plausible, relevant fac-
tors. one has to see which is the most relevant, how such factor
relates with another and how the overall configuration of ele-
ments articulates with psychodynamic processes. This, of course,
requires contextualisation.17 When this exacting task is not per-
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formed, when social conditions, if mentioned at all, take the
form of a ‘list’ of disconnected factors, then reductionism can-
not be avoided.
C. The Lacanian perspective
another important approach to the issue of violence, funda-
mentalist or not, focuses on the notion of the Lacanian jouis-
sance. The infant’s entrance into the sphere of language and
the symbolic leads to the irreversible loss of the type of full
jouissance that s/he enjoyed before the imposition of the ‘law
of the father’. The latter creates, via the ‘symbolic castration’
the division between the conscious and the unconscious, alien-
ation from the self and the other and a lack which can never be
permanently sutured (Lacan 1977). From the above perspective,
under objective conditions favouring fundamentalist tenden-
cies, the subject may attempt to recapture the lost full jouis-
sance of the pre-symbolic period by striving for a return to an
idealised past, traditional community (e.g. the Islamic Ummah)
within which perfect harmony, fraternal solidarity and ethical
purity prevailed. according to fundamentalist ideology, it is the
western subject, the imperialist other who has destroyed the
idealised, traditional community –s/he has stolen from the be-
lievers full jouissance. a way therefore to recapture it is via mas-
sive anti-imperialist, anti-western mobilisation, it is by resisting
and attacking the western ‘Satan’.
another way of expressing in Lacanian terms something
similar is to use the notions of identity and identification.18 The
subject tries to fill her/his lack via a series of identifications
which can never lead to a stable identity. Identities are always
fragile, fluid, ever changing. In such a situation, prevailing au-
thoritarian ideologies can attract those who have a desperate
need for a stable anchoring, for a permanent suturing of the de-
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18. on the way Lacan uses the concepts of identity and identification
and their relevance for the analysis of politics, see Stavrakakis 1999.
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sire for a stable identity. In a more general way, both the desire
for a lost full jouissance and for a stable identity express the
craving for a ‘fullness’ which can never be achieved. The La-
canian-oriented theorists Stavrakakis & Chrysoloras (2006) use
both the concepts of jouissance and identification in an attempt
to explain Greek chauvinistic nationalism during the last two
decades. according to Stavrakakis, the Lacanian perspective pro -
vides a non reductive way of linking the psychodynamic with
the social. The former focuses on the divided subject’s lack and
her/his desire for a return to a lost fullness, whereas the latter
leads us to the study of the construction of identities via the ana -
lysis of ideologies. Something similar is implied by Slavoj Zizek
who, when dealing with issues of violence (2009), argues that one
should study the subject on two levels: The psychoanalytic level
which entails concepts such as those of jouissance, lack, suture
etc.; and the discursive (‘symptomal’) level which focuses on
textual analysis, the construction of ideologies etc.
This type of theoretically worked out articulation between
the psychoanalytic jouissance and the social/cultural ideologies
is a useful step forward. It is different than the ‘list of factors’
approach which I mentioned in the previous section. But a more
systematic and detailed contextualisation is still needed. a con-
textualisation which leads to the exploration of how the articu-
lation between the psychodynamic and the social is achieved –by
specific collective actors or interest groups, specific institutional
arrangements, specific historical trajectories. In other terms, the
social cannot be limited to the study of ideological discourses
and the construction of identities.
To conclude this last section, psychoanalytic approaches to
fundamentalism explore, more or less successfully, the psycho-
dynamic processes which make a certain type of subject to adopt
fundamentalist ideologies and to join fundamentalist move-
ments. However, such approaches cannot explain in themselves
fundamentalism as a social, collective phenomenon. In order to
do this in a non reductive manner, one should show how the
psychodynamic articulates with the sociostructural. an effective
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articulation between the two levels presupposes serious contex-
tualisation. It presupposes an in-depth analysis of how psycho-
dynamic processes have an elective affinity with sociostructural
ones, or how exactly the former strengthen or weaken the dy-
namics of the latter.
General conclusion
The paper, by focusing on Islamic fundamentalism, has argued
that what distinguishes fundamentalism as a modern phenome-
non is not only the use of modern technologies (material and or-
ganizational), but also and primarily the social structure of fun-
damentalist regimes or social movements. More specifically, our
analysis showed the isomorphy or the elective affinity between
modernity’s unique sociostructural features (mobilisation/inclu -
sion into the national centre, top-down differentiation and wide -
spread individualization) and fundamentalism’s unique socio -
structural features. It is only in this way that fundamentalism as
a modern phenomenon can be distinguished from pre-modern
theocratic regimes and authoritarian religious movements. In
order to show the centrality of the unique sociostructural fea-
tures of modernity for the exploration of fundamentalism, I have
examined the phenomenon on three levels: the cultural, the so-
ciostructural and the psychodynamic.
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